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THE FUTURE AS AN INTELLECTUAL  
TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION
From Centralised Planning to Reflexive Management1
The Soviet future, understood as the subject of utopian narratives, visual representa-
tions and plans, has been studied by cultural historians, sociologists and historians 
of science and technology, who, albeit focusing on different empirical material, 
shared a focus on the end products of Soviet futuring, such as visual images and 
stories, art and industrial projects.2 In contrast, this article shifts the focus from 
representations of the Soviet future to the much less known area of the mecha-
nism of its production: the theories and methods of Soviet future studies. Given 
the abundance of work on Soviet and Western planning associated with the welfare 
state, the lack of knowledge on the role of future studies in these processes is quite 
astonishing. Yet I suggest that there is a good reason to scrutinise the history and 
legacy of Soviet future studies, for this was an area where some decidedly different 
notions of the future emerged, paving the way for the post‑Soviet transformation.3 
As a rule, such niche zones for the production of alternative futures were situated 
1. I thank Irina Sandomirskaja, Francis Dodsworth, Nadège Ragaru, Jenny Andersson and
Alena Ledeneva, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The views 
and errors, naturally, are the author’s only.
2. These are the studies on utopia, modernist projects in the arts, architecture and design, 
society and industry. See, for instance, Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant‑garde, 
Aesthetic Dictatorship and Beyond (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); David 
Crowley, Jane Pavitt, eds, Cold War Modern 1945‑1970 (London: V&A, 2010); Richard Stites, 
Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1989); Edith Cloves, Russian Experimental Fiction: Resisting Ideology after Utopia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Paul Josephson, “Projects of the Century” in 
“Soviet History: Large Scale Technologies from Stalin to Gorbachev,” Technology and 
Culture, 36, 3 (1995): 519‑559.
3. Here I draw on the larger research agenda on global future studies advanced by Jenny
Andersson. For a discussion, see Jenny Andersson Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, “Introduction: Toward 
a New History of the Future,” in Jenny Andersson, Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, eds, The Struggle for 
Cahiers du Monde russe, 56/1, Janvier‑mars 2015, p. 111‑134.
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close to the centre of power, in the strategic areas of scientific expertise and indus-
trial development. The history of Soviet future studies is therefore that of a trans-
formation from within the system. 
Discussing one of the most prominent examples of Soviet future studies, the 
case of the Russian philosopher and management guru Georgii Petrovich Shche-
drovitskii (1929‑1994), this article contributes new empirical material to social 
studies of the Soviet future, but also contributes to debates about informality as 
a central source of power in the Soviet regime, which left a significant legacy for 
post‑Soviet development. I argue that the development of a new understanding of 
teleological or goal‑oriented governance as a means of producing the future led to 
a significant transformation of the authoritarian Soviet regime, a process which had 
an ambivalent outcome. Although these new tools promised better control of the 
future, they eventually undermined the power monopoly of the Communist Party 
by creating new spaces of action and new sources of authority, such as the scien-
tific methodology of management. This opened up a space for new actors and new 
methods, which smuggled in different versions of the Soviet future, underscoring 
uncertainty, plurality and less than optimistic visions.4
However, as the case of Shchedrovitskii shows, this dispersion of power over the 
future did not automatically lead to the shaping of institutions dedicated to the prin-
ciples of openness and democracy, but rather reinforced and perpetuated informal 
relations. These informal relations performed a vital role under the Soviet regime 
by making the Soviet economy work; but, as Alena Ledeneva shows, informality 
turned out to be a “modernisation trap” in the post‑Soviet context. Although the 
ambiguous role of informality in the Soviet society and economy has been studied 
extensively by Alena Ledeneva and Carole Sigman, we lack knowledge about the 
impact of informality in the development of post‑Soviet policy sciences.5 If in the 
Soviet economic sphere informality was demonised as an informal economy, which 
at best compensated for the shortage economy, informal connections in the polit-
ical sphere were interpreted as the cradle of civic society. During the post‑Soviet 
period informal practices in both economy and politics became suspect as roots of 
corruption. However, social studies of informality, as well as management theory, 
suggest that formal rules and informal practices constitute a complex assemblage 
rather than conflict with one another. This is a significant issue because the Soviet 
future was set not only in the official planning guidelines produced by the Party, but 
the Long‑Term in Transnational Science and Politics: Forging the Future (London & New 
York, Routledge, 2015).
4. See Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, “Towards the Joint Future Beyond the Iron Curtain: East‑West
Politics of Global Modelling”, in Andersson and Rindzevičiūtė, eds., The Struggle for the 
Long Term.
5. Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post‑ 
Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Carole Sigman, “Les 
clubs politiques informels acteurs du basculement de la perestroïka,” Revue française de 
science politique, 5, 58 (2008): 617‑642; Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: 
Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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it was also informally negotiated in dispersed academic and management milieus, 
particularly among the policy sciences, such as global modelling and forecasting.6
The case of Shchedrovitskii helps unlock this hidden history of an informally 
produced Soviet technology for shaping the future that emerged as an alternative to 
central planning; first, through the conceptual approach of reflexivity in the 1960s, 
then as a widespread practice of activity‑games in the late 1970s. This approach 
originated in the Moscow methodological circle (first called the Moscow logical 
circle, 1952‑1954), which evolved from a student discussion group into a network 
revolving first around Aleksandr Zinov’ev and, from 1958, around Georgii Shch-
dedrovitskii. The members of the circle discussed Marxism, formal logic and 
social psychology, but also the nascent systems approach and information theory. 
Retrospectively Moscow methodologists described themselves as belonging to the 
systems approach.7 
Although Shchedrovitskii was careful to record and otherwise document his activ-
ities, he remained invisible to scholars interested in institutional histories of Soviet 
governance. There is next to nothing published on him in Anglophone academia. 
One reason for this is that Shchedrovitskii was an intellectual entrepreneur who oper-
ated under the umbrella of many different institutes. His activities did not fit into 
the existing conceptual framework of analysis according to which research institutes 
fed data and methods to Gosplan, which churned out economic and social develop-
ment plans and centrally administered them.8 Furthermore, in part because of this lack 
of stable institutional affiliation with planning bodies, Shchedrovitskii appears only 
in studies of philosophy or Soviet civil society.9 But Shchedrovitskii’s legacy is not 
simply an intellectual curiosity: his case can be used as a key to understand both the 
Soviet and post‑Soviet development of Russian governance.
As a co‑founder of the Moscow methodological circle, later known as the 
Moscow methodological school of management, Shchedrovitskii is well known in 
the circles of Russian management practitioners and policy makers as a mysterious, 
6. Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, “A Struggle for Soviet Future: The Birth of Scientific Forecasting in the
Soviet Union,” Slavic Review (forthcoming, Spring 2016).
7. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Sistemnoe dvizhenie i perspektivy razvitiia sistemno‑strukturnoi
metodologii [The systems movement from the perspective of development of system‑structural 
methodology],” in Georgii Shchedrovitskii, Izbrannye Trudy [Œuvres choisies] (M.: Shkola 
kul´turnoi politiki, 1995), 57‑87.
8. Existing studies on Soviet management distinguish a group of “Americanisers” who directly 
borrowed US ideas of leadership and human interaction. Focusing on the formalisation of 
governance through institutional design, new technologies of data processing and control, 
such as computers and computer networks, and planning techniques, these studies overlooked 
the important role of Shchedrovitskii in the development of Soviet governmentality. Richard 
Vidmer, “Management Science in the USSR: The Role of ‘Americanizers’,” International 
Studies Quarterly, 24, 3 (1980): 392‑414, 402. 
9. For example, Shchedrovitskii is absent from a recent Russian history of management thought. 
N.V. Ovchinnikova, ed., Istoriia upravlencheskoi mysli [The history of governmental thought] 
(M.: RGGU, 2013). The only historical study on Shchedrovitskii is in French and discusses 
his thought and practice exclusively in relation to Marxist philosophy, social theory and social 
psychology, Svetlana Tabatchnikova, Le cercle de méthodologie de Moscou (1954‑1988): une 
pensée, une pratique (P.: EHESS, 2007).
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charismatic personality, described by one of his students as Voland, the dark char-
acter from Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita.10 Shchedrovitskii was one of the first 
genuine management consultants and gurus in the Soviet Union: in the 1980s he 
conducted almost 100 training sessions, many of which hosted 150‑200  practi-
tioners and he left many followers, including his son, Petr Shchedrovitskii, who 
continues training Russian CEOs and who has himself occupied significant posi-
tions of authority, for instance, as director‑general for strategy at the Russian 
nuclear authority Rosatom. The website of the Moscow‑based Foundation of 
Shchedrovitskii lists 40 organisations and individual members of the methodolog-
ical circle from Russia, Latvia and Ukraine.11 Whereas some of these members are 
the old‑timers of the circle, such as the philosophers Oleg Genisaretskii and Boris 
Sazonov, others include private consultancies providing expertise to corporations 
and governmental bodies, such as Moscow Methodological Corporation. Further-
more, Shchedrovitskii’s work is quoted in thousands of research papers and disser-
tations published mainly by Russian researchers in the fields of management, media 
studies, political science, philosophy and pedagogics.12 
Moreover, the Shchedrovitskii legacy is not limited to an arcane society of 
management philosophers, but is endorsed by Vladimir Putin’s government. For 
instance, several high ranking officials recently acknowledged drawing their inspi-
ration and methods from Shchedrovitskii’s work. These include Viktor Khristenko, 
previously the Minister of industry, trade and energy and, from 2011, the chairman 
of the board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, and Andrei Reus, a former 
director‑general of Oboronprom, a Russian‑Belarusian corporation specialising in 
the defence industry.13 Both Khristenko and Reus paid homage to Shchedrovitskii 
by publishing a sizeable collection on Shchedrovitskii’s and their own writing, not 
only in Russian, but also in English with Bloomsbury. In 2015 this UK publication 
was shortlisted for the Chartered Management Institute’s Management Book of the 
Year. In this way, Shchedrovitskii’s thought had travelled quite a journey, from 
semi‑underground discussion clubs of the 1950s to the boardrooms of Rosatom and 
the pages of an officially endorsed publication with a major London‑based press. 
The question is: what made Shchedrovitskii’s method of the control of the future 
relevant and resilient in the context of radical political and economic change? 
One way to answer this question, I suggest, is to re‑interpret the legacy of Shche-
drovitskii in Soviet management and policy sciences, analysing his efforts as a 
particular attempt to harness informal practices to enhance the control of the future, 
practices which complemented the planning based on formal, scientific knowledge, 
10. Tatiana Osintseva, “Novaia utka,” Prometa.ru. Accessed 10 April 2015.
11. See fondgp.ru.
12. I base this statement on a Google Scholar search. The catalogue of the National Library of
Russia lists over 1,700 doctoral dissertations that quote Shchedrovitskii’s work, dating from 
the 1990s.
13. See Viktor Khristenko, Aleksandr Reus, Aleksandr Zinchenko et al., Methodological 
School of Management (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
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typically pursued by high modernist states. By formal knowledge I mean the 
sciences produced within defined institutional environments, institutes and labo-
ratories, documented in publications and fed to into the governmental process 
through reports and statistics; in short, the end products of future expertise. It is 
on this formal scientific knowledge that the existing studies of Soviet governance 
focus, attributing to the Soviet regime the characteristics of a high modernist state.14 
Now, high modernist states, the argument goes, have a particularly formal take on 
time: time is a dimension produced by specific knowledge instruments, not only 
clocks, but also statistical time series, history and, more recently, an array of future 
studies methods.15 High modernist states seek to capture, understand and control the 
apparent chaos of life, giving birth to a number of new institutions and professions 
that mediate knowledge production, planning and governance. In the second half of 
the twentieth century a new class of so called technocrats engaged in Big Science 
emerged, seeking to enable precisely this kind of control over both short and long 
term.16 Yet the aim of Shchedrovitskii’s methodology was exactly the opposite of 
the objectives of Big Science: instead of making things visible it made them invis-
ible, seeking to de‑stabilise and de‑formalise managerial relations.17 As a result, 
Shchedrovitskii developed a very particular thought collective for the production of 
the future, capable of surviving the overhaul of the Soviet state apparatus. 
Thus I show how Shchedrovitskii’s methodology, in particular his notion of 
“forward reflexiveness” (in Russian, vpered napravlennaia refleksiia and pros-
pektivnaia refleksiia) challenged the input‑output model of predictive expertise, 
according to which the information revealed by scientific forecasting was supplied 
to the Soviet planning organs to assist decision‑makers.18 I detail the ways in which 
Shchedrovitskii developed his own model of the reflexive co‑production of the 
14. For a comparative analysis of high modernism see James Scot, Seeing Like a State: How
Certain Schemes to Improve Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999). 
15. For a well‑structured overview of different methods of forecasting, see J. Scott Armstrong,
Long‑Range Forecasting: From Crystal Ball to Computer (New York & Chichester: Wiley, 
1985); for governmental uses of statistics, Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: 
A History of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). For an 
overview of the role of predictive technologies in high modernist state see Jenny Andersson, 
“Governing Futures: States and the Management of Expectations,” in Patrick Le Gales, 
Desmond King, Rethinking the State (Oxford, forthcoming).
16. For technocracy see Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury
Park & London: Sage, 1990); see also Peter Galison, Bruce William Hevly, eds., Big Science: 
The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
17. Some Russian commentators attribute to Shchedrovitskii, alongside with authors of Soviet 
science fiction, a new way of envisioning the social future that emerged in the 1960s. But 
others, like Kukulin, note that Shchedrovitskii’s method had many non‑democratic implica-
tions. See Il´ia Kukulin, “Alternative Social Blueprinting in Soviet Society of the 1960s and the 
1970s, or Why Left‑Wing Political Practices Have Not Caught on in Contemporary Russia,” 
Russian Studies in History, 49, 4 (2011):51‑92. 
18. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, Orgupravlencheskoe myshlenie: ideologiia, metodologiia,
tekhnologiia [Organisational‑governmental thinking: ideology, methodology, technology] 
(M.: Studia Artemeva Lebedeva, 2013), 154.
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future, as revealed in his theoretical writings and documentation of his workshops 
and lectures. A brief note on my sources is necessary. I mainly draw on the published 
primary materials, i.e. books, articles and memoirs published by Shchedrovitskii 
and his colleagues, which reveal the conceptual importance of informality for the 
future‑oriented governance. They also contain some examples of informal inter-
action. However, Shchedrovitskii’s workshops, through which he disseminated 
his ideas among practitioners, are never described in detail, for these workshops 
were confidential in their character. Nevertheless, the available sources, such as 
secondary comments and some transcripts of workshop discussions, are more than 
adequate to gain insight and appreciate the distinctive role that Shchedrovitskii’s 
ideas played in the changing Soviet governance of the future. In what follows, 
I briefly outline the origins of teleological planning as a future‑oriented governance 
in the West and the Soviet Union and then discuss the ways in which teleological 
planning was conceptualised and practiced in Shchedrovitskii’s work.
Who Sets the Goals? Modifying Marxist Teleology through Cybernetics
According to Andersson, the twentieth‑century notion of the prediction of the 
future as a category of control has little to do with the centuries‑long tradition of 
thinking about possible worlds or utopian societies, but refers instead to a particular 
understanding of the future as a product of special methods, such as scientific fore-
casting, foresight, and many other forms of future studies.19 These methods, which 
originated from a very particular development in military technology, were a part 
and parcel of a postwar governmentality, by which I refer, in line with Michel 
Foucault, to an assemblage of intellectual and material technologies of govern-
ance.20 The concept of governmentality is highly suitable to describe the assem-
blage of theories, networks and institutions that were generated by Shchedrovitskii 
not least because Shchedrovitskii’s core belief was that knowledge could be used as 
a performative instrument of governance. The notion of intellectual technology, for 
Shchedrovitskii and his followers, was therefore not merely an analytical concept, 
but an instrument of governance that they sought to develop. In this section I thus 
contextualise this ambition in the history of postwar technologies of governance.21
19. Jenny Andersson, “Midwives of the Future: Futurism, Futures Studies and the Shaping of 
the Global Imagination,” in Andersson, Rindzevičiūtė, eds.,The Struggle for the Long Term.
20. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1977‑1978 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 108‑109.
21. Shchedrovitskii himself inscribes the history of his approach in the context of East‑West
transfer of management sciences, such as systems analysis and the operations research. To be 
sure, the historical context could go back to the interwar and even earlier period, where system 
thinking began to emerge in the fields of engineering and biology, both in Western Europe, 
the US but also, in the thought of Alexander Bogdanov. Schedrovitskii’s thought also derived 
its inspiration from the interwar linguistics and pedagogy. Yet due to space limitation, in this 
article I focus my discussion on the postwar development of cybernetics and systems analysis, 
the fields that gave legitimacy to Shchedrovitskii’s work during the Soviet period.
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During the Second World War the efforts to construct automatic anti‑aircraft 
systems required quick, automatic prediction of the behaviour of an incoming 
enemy plane. The construction of such a tool made clear that it was not so much 
past causes, but future goals which determined behaviour in complex, man‑ 
machine systems. This phenomenon was theorised by the US scientists Norbert 
Wiener, a mathematician, Arturo Rosenblueth, a physiologist, and Julian Bigelow, 
a computer engineer, introducing the notion of teleological behaviour in 1943.22 
The notion of teleological – or goal‑oriented – behaviour was created to explain, 
simulate and improve organisms and machines, for instance, a neural disorder such 
as Parkinson’s disease, a digitally powered prosthetic arm, or a guided missile.
For us it is important to note that the idea of teleological behaviour drew 
on a particular notion of the future as an anticipated and predictable state. 
Thus, teleological behaviour was defined as a process that seeks a particular goal 
and continuously evaluates the present state with regards to an anticipated, final 
state. The goal is reached when the current state overlaps with the anticipated state. 
Goal‑seeking behaviour, therefore, relies on communication with the external 
environment, flowing through feedback loops. In turn, goal‑seeking behaviour 
operates on the basis of difference: the specific content of the representation of the 
anticipated future state is important but not sufficient to generate action. Instead it 
is the perceived difference between this representation of an anticipated state and 
the actual state that activates teleological behaviour.
The idea of teleological behaviour gained influence beyond engineering 
and medical applications in a wide range of fields leading to a rethinking of the 
character of order and control in politics, society and culture. In extreme tech-
nocratic instances the teleological governance of the future manifested in policy 
process through statistical calculations, used to achieve clearly defined goals. 
The teleological governance of the future entailed gathering predictive information 
about the future state of the governed systems, for instance, the economy, society 
or natural resources, and making decisions on the basis of this information. It is 
quite clear that understood this simply, teleological behaviour could be reconciled 
with state planning. It is in this sense that Soviet state planners declared that cyber-
netics was the foremost tool for helping the Party to reach the anticipated final state, 
communism.23 However, teleological behaviour cannot be limited to the processing 
of information: indeed, teleological behaviour is about goal‑setting. Once the 
behaviour of individual managers, collectives or companies is framed as teleolog-
ical, goal‑seeking behaviour, their subservience to the Party becomes less self‑evi-
dent. In complex systems, such as firms, states and societies, goal setting is highly 
problematic: in part, because goal‑setting requires processing a large amount of 
information and, in part, because being socially negotiated, the goals tend to change 
22. Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, Julian Bigelow, “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology,”
Philosophy of Science, 10 (1943):18‑24.
23. For the development of cybernetics in the Soviet Union, see Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak
to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002). 
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over the course of action. For this reason, as I show in the next section, teleological 
behaviour turned out to be no mere instrument for implementing the communist 
utopia, but a source of contradictions and transformations. 
That the development of predictive knowledge‑based management did not 
bypass the Soviet Union says a lot about the elasticity of the notion of the communist 
future. It was not sufficient for Khrushchev to declare the coming of communism 
in twenty years: the Soviet planners needed to know the future states of natural 
resources both in the Soviet Union and in the world, the rate of the use of these 
resources, the growth of the Soviet and world population, and the emergence of 
new technology. In order to know all these futures, specific expertise was neces-
sary. The development of such expertise, in turn, posited a need for institutional 
reform, enabling experts to access information and feed their studies into policy 
and management process. That this plurality of futures would be accommodated 
by Soviet planners from the beginning of the mid‑1960s revealed their pragmatic 
intention to keep the Soviet economy going. This future‑pragmatism, as I show in 
the case of Shchedrovitskii, was conducive to significant innovations.
Many studies have shown that the most influential scientific methodologies of 
anticipatory knowledge originated in the United States and the United Kingdom during 
the postwar period: these methods were first developed in military research institutes, 
such as the RAND Corporation in the 1940s, and spilled over into the emergent 
disciplines of management and economic planning in the 1950s‑60s.24 The Soviets 
keenly borrowed these approaches, including Operations Research, game theory, 
technology assessment and the Delphi method, intending to use them to construct their 
own, socialist future.25 When in 1966 Kosygin’s and Brezhnev’s government claimed 
to be based on scientific knowledge of the future, they referred to highly formalised 
forms of knowledge, such as trend calculations, scenarios and expert surveys, which 
were to be used for “optimal” planning purposes. By adopting these scientific tools 
the Soviets thus opened up to the Western rationalisation of governance.26
Scientific forecasting demanded data about the past and present to extra‑
polate alternative future scenarios. Elsewhere I have argued that the introduction 
of scientific forecasting to Soviet planning had an unexpected effect on existing 
administrative practices. For instance, economic forecasters based at Gosplan 
required transparency, understood as the free circulation of statistical data.27 
24. Frank Kaplan, The Wizzards of Armaggedon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991);
David Jardini, Out of the Blue Yonder: The RAND Corporation’s Diversification into Social 
Welfare Research, 1946‑1968 (Carnegie Mellon, an unpublished PhD dissertation, 1996). For a 
good overview of policy sciences see Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes 
a Cyborg Science (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001).
25. Rindzevičiūtė, “A Struggle for the Soviet Future.”
26. S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2003); Paul Erickson et al, How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: 
The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).
27. Rindzevičiūtė, “A Struggle for the Soviet Future,” and Rindzevičiūtė, “Towards the Joint
Future Beyond the Iron Curtain.”
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This was not allowed: Soviet bureaucratic compartmentalisation and pervasive 
secrecy prevented the circulation of data across different branches. As a result, 
even branch forecasts were technically flawed, because they could not take into 
consideration the developments in connected branches. My argument is that it was 
another unintended effect of scientific forecasting which turned out to be more 
significant: scientific forecasters produced negative images of the Soviet future 
economy, natural resources and environment, feeding them through secret reports 
to the government. Scientific forecasting, in this way, was used to criticise both 
Soviet bureaucratic secrecy and contemporary policies. Instead of empowering the 
Soviet government, scientific forecasting eventually eroded the regime from within 
by pointing out the inadequacy of decision‑making, based on informal bargaining 
among Gosplan officials and industry managers.28
But forecasting, an example of a highly formalised scientific expertise, was 
only one component in the complex milieu of Soviet governance, where informal, 
personal relations played an extremely important role, both in political and economic 
decision making.29 Despite being widespread, informal practices in governance 
were not legitimate in the Soviet Union: any divergence from the top‑down organ-
isation of democratic centralism and Party control was suspect and subject to the 
investigations of the security organs (KGB).30 Informal practices were something 
of a public secret: everyone knew about it, in particular the personalist approach to 
decision making, but this aspect was a source of anxiety that clashed with the ideal 
of formal steering. In the following sections I show that Shchedrovitskii’s genius 
was precisely lending a formal, scientific methodology to provide legitimacy for 
informal planning of the future in Soviet firms and administrations.
The First Soviet Management Guru
Georgii Petrovich Shchedrovitskii’s father was an aviation engineer, coming from 
a politically active family of Russian Jews, and his mother was a micro biologist.31 
Georgii’s family was close to strategic Soviet industries: having returned to 
Moscow after the war Georgii’s father became the director of Orgaviaprom, the 
Research Institute for the Organisation of the Aviation Industry. In his memoir 
28. Paul Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret
Archives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
29. See Ledeneva and Stephen Fortescue, ed., Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
30. This led some scholars to propose that it was KGB and not scientific experts that played 
the central role of information processing in the Soviet governance. Scott Shane, Dismantling 
Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994). See also 
Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kantorovich, eds. The Destruction of the Soviet Economic 
System: An Insider’s History (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).
31. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, Ia vsegda byl idealistom… [ I have always been an idealist ] 
(M., 2001), 62‑67.
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Georgii Shchedrovitskii recalls interacting daily with members of both party 
and military‑industrial complex elites as a child.32 In this way yhe future semi‑ 
underground thinker and management guru grew up in a privileged social environ-
ment of committed communists, well integrated in the nomenclature networks of 
power. At school Georgii excelled in mathematics and enrolled to study physics 
at the prestigious Moscow State University (MGU) in 1946. However, Shchedro-
vitskii soon became attracted to broader questions and, to the disappointment of 
both his parents and physics teachers, transferred to the philosophy department in 
1949, the year of harsh ideological attacks against “cosmopolitanism”. Put off by 
the rigid observance of Marxist‑Leninist dogmas and “continuous fear” among the 
faculty, he sought shelter in the department of logic, which was relatively immune 
to ideological dogmas.33 Shchedrovitskii graduated in 1953 and, from February 
1954, launched a seminar on logic and philosophy at MGU, around which a group 
entitled the Moscow logical circle emerged.34 In 1956 Shchedrovitskii joined 
the Communist Party. During his subsequent career Shchedrovitskii belonged to 
several institutes: he was affiliated with the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 
then the All‑Union Institute of Technical Aesthetics (VNIITE) in 1965‑1969, and 
the Institute for the International Labour Movement (IMRD). Although Shchedro-
vitskii travelled abroad only once, to Bulgaria in 1991, his affiliation with these and 
other institutes facilitated his access to Western scholarship.35 Both VNIITE and 
IMRD were rare islands where social thought and the humanities could be devel-
oped in a less ideologically restricted environment. These spaces of relative liberty 
were restricted after the Prague Spring in 1968.36 
Soviet scientific forecasters were trained predominantly in mathematics, physics 
or engineering; the leading scholars gathered in the Scientific Research Institute of 
Economics at Gosplan, the Institute of Automation and Control, the Central Insti-
tute of Mathematical Economics (TsEMI) and, from 1976, the Institute of Systems 
Research (VNIISI).37 In contrast, Shchedrovitskii came to policy sciences from the 
field of philosophy and logic. These were not entirely different worlds: in the late 
1950s and the 1960s the circles of humanities and mathematical scholars inter-
twined, in particular under the transdisciplinary umbrella of cybernetics. Indeed, 
32.  Shchedrovitskii, Ia vsegda, 74‑75.
33. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Lektsiia 1: 18 fevralia 1988 [ Lecture 1, 18 February 1988 ],” in
Zapisi Rizhskogo metodologicheskogo seminara, vol.1 [Notes from the Riga seminar on meth-
odology] (Riga: BISI, 2010), 27‑28.
34. Shchedrovitskii, “Lektsiia 1,” 17, 52.
35. Shchedrovitskii often cited academic literature in English. He read the principal works
in systems analysis by Quade, Optner, Ackoff, Bertalanffy, Anatolii Rapoport, and Herbert 
Simon, many of which were translated, but also available in the original language at Moscow 
libraries. Shchedrovitskii often refers to structuralists, such as Saussure and Parsons. It is some-
what odd, however, that he does not refer to any Western works on business games. See Georgii 
Shchedrovitskii, Izbrannye trudy.
36. Dmitry Azrikan, “VNIITE, Dinosaur of Totalitarianism or Plato’s Academy of Design?”
Design Issues, 15, 3 (1999): 45‑77.
37. For an overview of Soviet forecasting, see Rindzevičiūtė, “A Struggle for the Soviet Future.”
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the fascination with cybernetics and the emerging systems approach led to intense 
contacts across disciplines and institutes. Informal gatherings were not unusual, 
for instance several informal groups discussed ideas aiming to reform Marxism‑ 
Leninism, most famously in the circles around Evald Il’enkov.38 The so‑called 
Moscow methodological circle also originated as an informal gathering of logic 
students in a pub on Gor’kii street, linking future prominent Russian thinkers such 
as the mathematician Aleksander Zinov’ev, author of a satire of Soviet academia 
The Yawning Heights, who fell out with the group in 1958; the sociologist Boris 
Grushin and Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili. 
The group attracted the attention of the KGB and the young scholars were 
questioned and reprimanded, but not prevented from meeting. After all, their 
intellectual interest concerned the highly strategic fields of cybernetics and the 
systems approach that lent legitimacy to the circle’s intellectual experiments in 
philosophy. For instance, in 1962, together with later prominent systems theo-
rists Vadim Sadovskii and Erik Iudin, Shchedrovitskii organised a seminar on 
systems analysis methods in science and technology under the Scientific Council 
for Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences; the work of this seminar continued 
until 1976. In this seminar young scholars discussed Western approaches to 
general systems theory, an approach that was highly innovative in the 1960s 
and strongly promoted as part of the on‑going efforts for the computerisation and 
automation of governance in the Soviet Union.39 Other systems thinkers, such as 
Igor Blauberg, formed a close circle of Shchedrovitskii’s friends. Later in the 
1960s Shchedrovitskii would co‑author one of the first works on the systems 
approach in the Soviet Union.40 In all, the Moscow methodological circle sought 
to combine the emerging systems approach with Marxist political theory and 
epistemology: they revisited Marx’s Capital searching for a definition of system-
atic and performative knowledge.
It is quite possible that being less interested in engineering systems and computer 
technology, Shchedrovitskii was more perceptive to social processes in organisa-
tions than the proponents of forecasting. He was deeply interested in Lev Vygot-
sky’s idea of reflexivity in learning, with which he engaged in his candidate of 
science dissertation (kandidatskaia dissertatsia), defended in 1964.41 His ideas also 
developed in proximity to Vladimir Lefevr, who developed a theory of reflexive 
control in military strategy in his Conflicting Structures, first published in 1967.42 
38. Vesa Oittinen, ed., Evald Ilyenkov’s Philosophy Revisited (Helsinki: Kikimora, 2000).
39. This seminar was criticised by some influential hardliners, such as a philosopher, academi-
cian Todor Pavlov. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Problemy metodologii sistemnogo issledovaniia 
(1964) [The methodological problems of systems research],” in Shchedrovitskii, Izbrannye; 
also “K tvorcheskoi biografii G.P.  Shchedrovitskogo (1929‑1994) [ Toward an intellectual 
biography of G.P. Shchedrovitskii],” in Shchedrovitskii, Izbrannye (1995), xxiii‑xxiv.
40. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, Problemy metodologii sistemnogo issledovaniia.
41. See the biography on www.fondgp.org.
42. Vladimir Lefevr, Konfliktuiushchie struktury [Conflicting structures] (M.: Vysh.shkola,
1967).
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According to Lefevr, one adversary can influence his opponent by imposing on 
the opponent one’s own conceptual basis for decision‑making.43 Lefevr’s semiotic 
strategy of control would inspire Shchedrovitskii to develop psychological and 
system‑analytical elaborations of the reflexive control of collective behaviour in 
non‑military contexts.
If the 1970s were a period of intense development and internationalisation 
of systems analysis in the Soviet Union, for Shchedrovitskii this was a diffi-
cult time as he became ostracised for his political activism. In 1968 Shche-
drovitskii signed a letter of support to the dissidents Aleksander Ginzburg and 
Iurii Galanskov and, as a consequence, was expelled from both the Party and 
VNIITE in March 1969. The publication of his work, a couple of monographs 
on the methodology of design, was disrupted. Nevertheless, thanks to the help 
of his friends, Shchedrovitskii found shelter at the experimental workshop of the 
All‑Union of Artists, which enabled him to develop further his work on peda-
gogy and provided him with a modest income. These repressive measures did 
not discourage Shchedrovitskii from continuing his intellectual activities, quite 
the opposite, he remained actively involved in the development of the methodo-
logical circle.44 He managed to get employment in applied areas, such as sports 
research institutes. Whereas it seemed impossible for him to get affiliation with 
the prestigious and strategic institutes, such as the Institute of Systems Research 
(VNIISI, est. 1976) and the Institute of Control Sciences, where much of the 
innovative research into systems approach and forecasting was concentrated, 
Shchedrovitskii kept in touch with these milieus as he gave talks and partic-
ipated in their seminars.45 His seminar and informal club were regarded with 
suspicion by the authorities, but his scientific approach was not.46 Indeed, subse-
quent developments testify to the substantial interest of highly positioned Soviet 
managers in Shchedrovitskii’s work. 
As he became an outcast of the Soviet academic mainstream, Shchedrovitskii 
responded by turning to entrepreneurship. In the late 1970s he embarked on the 
increasingly popular form of management training through business or simula-
tion games, which he used as a vehicle to develop his theory of reflexive thinking‑ 
activity, combining Lefevr’s notion of reflexive control, teleological behaviour 
and complexity, an important aspect of the systems approach. Whereas simulation 
43. Timothy L.  Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military”, Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2004):237‑256.
44. Reportedly, all the signatories of this letter lost their professional jobs. Shchedrovitskii 
would be able to publish again in a few years after the repression. Thus, in addition to many 
articles, he co‑authored a monograph on automated systems in design, together with Oleg 
Genisaretskii and Anatolii Rapaport, among others, published in 1975. Anatolii Piskoppel´, 
“K tvorcheskoi..” xxxii‑xxxiii.
45. Piskoppel´, “K tvorcheskoi…”, xxxii‑xxxiii.
46. Biographers note that several colleagues of Shchedrovitskii left his circle in the mid‑1970s,
because they thought that their participation in this informal collective could obstruct their 
careers. Piskoppel´, “K tvorcheskoi…”, xxxiii.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.92 - 05/02/2018 17h19. © Éditions de l'EHESS 
THE FUTURE AS AN INTELLECTUAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION 123
games were developed at several new and influential institutes, such as VNIISI and 
the Academy of National Economy in Moscow,47 Shchedrovitskii’s innovation was 
that he transferred this method to managerial practice, first and foremost to regional 
and urban planning. 
Reflexivity and the Soviet Future
It is important to stress that Shchedrovitskii was not interested in producing end 
images of the future. Indeed, although he used many complex and sometimes bizarre 
schemes, his emphasis was on processes. Shchedrovitskii defines his methodology 
as an intense, reflexive formulation and coordination of group goals through the 
means of a highly formalised scientific method. Methodology, according to Shche-
drovitskii, is first and foremost performative:
The essence of methodological work is not so much understanding, but the 
creation of methods and projects; it does not simply reflect, but rather builds, 
creates anew through constructing and projecting.48
He then continues:
[…] the principal products of methodological work, such as constructions, 
projects, norms, methodical prescriptions and so on, cannot be tested and are 
never tested as truthful. Only their do‑ability can be tested. […] When we 
project a city, it is meaningless to ask if our project is truthful, for this project 
corresponds not to a city that was, but to a city that will be; the project does not 
reflect a city, but the city will realise the project.49
In these statements, as elsewhere, Shchedrovitskii posits his methodology as a 
value‑neutral tool, a non‑political technology: methodology is neither truthful nor 
false, it either works or does not. The question to what end methodology is working 
is the responsibility of managers, not methodologists. The role of a methodolo-
gist, according to Shchedrovitskii, is to create conditions enabling managers to 
learn projecting for the future through collective efforts of thinking‑activity, where 
reflexivity plays an important role.
47. Nickolai Lapin, Boris Sazonov, “The Activity‑Systems Approach to Development of the
Human Factor in Innovation,” in Stuart A. Umpleby, Vadim N. Sadovsky, eds., A Science 
of Goal Formulation: American and Soviet Discussions of Cybernetics and Systems Theory 
(New York: Hemisphere, 1991), 195‑206.
48. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Printsipy i obshchaia schema metodologicheskoi organizatsii
sistemno‑strukturnykh issledovanii i razrabotok (1981) [Principles and the general scheme 
of methodological organisation of system‑structural research and applications],” Izbrannye 
trudy, 95.
49. Shchedrovitskii, “Printsipy”.
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The original meaning of the word “reflexivity” entails looking back and not 
forward; reflexivity describes “a mental action, process, etc. turned or directed back 
upon the mind itself; involving intelligent self‑awareness or self‑examination”.50 
Yet we should remember that according to the cybernetic model, knowledge of 
the past (expressed in statistical trends or an initial state) is an absolutely neces-
sary condition of prediction. This link is captured in Shchedrovitskii’s notion of 
“forward reflexivity” or as it is sometimes translated into English, reflexiveness.51 
To define his notion, Shchedrovitskii skilfully blended several legitimate theoret-
ical traditions, drawing both on Hegelian and Marxist philosophies which under-
score the role of conscious goal‑setting for development. However, Shchedrovitskii 
drew conceptually on cognitive and system‑cybernetic sciences, particularly their 
applications in Operations Research and defence,52 to devise his own specific notion 
of reflexivity as a new cognitive mechanism, which not so much “reflects back”, but 
instead, “projects forward”. 
Shchedrovitskii’s work was part of a wide movement in 1960s psychology and 
social science toward reflexivity.53 Furthermore, Shchedrovitskii’s methodology 
is reminiscent of both French la prospective (indeed, he uses the term prospec-
tive, in Russian, prospektivnaia refleksiia) and of American business and policy 
simulation games. If la prospective was designed to facilitate strategic planning in 
large, bureaucratic organisations, such as state administration in France, American 
business games were developed to assist in solving concrete problems in firms.54 
Both sought to establish informal relations across administrative divides, mobi-
lising informality to generate new, alternative understandings of the future.55 These 
methods, as noted by historian of science and technology Jennifer Light, were 
50. See the entry in the Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com. Accessed on 10 April 2015.
51. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Mental Activity and Pure Thought,”in Khristenko, Reus, 
Zinchenko et al., Methodological School of Management, 38.
52. Namely, the work of Lefevr, see Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Refleksiia [Reflexivity]”
(1974), in Izbrannye trudy, 485‑495. 
53. For a discussion of different modes and historical development of reflexivity, see Margaret
Archer, The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity, 2012); Roger Smith, “Does Reflexivity Separate the Human Sciences from the Natural 
Sciences?” History of the Human Sciences, 18, 4 (2005):1‑25.
54. George Dantzig and Jay Forrester were among the first to develop computer applications
for group decisions. For RAND and planning see Jennifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: 
Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2003); Jennifer Light, “Taking Games Seriously”, Technology and Culture, 
49, 2 (2008): 347‑375. For an overview of business games, see Joseph Wolfe, “A History of 
Business Teaching Games in English‑Speaking and Post‑Socialist Countries: The Origination 
and Diffusion of a Management Education and Development Technology,” Simulation and 
Gaming 24, 4 (1993): 445‑463; D.J. Power, A Brief History of Decision Support Systems, 
DSSResources.com, version 4.0 (10 March 2007).
55. See, for instance, Michel Godet, “From Forecasting to la prospective: A New Way of
Looking at Futures,” Journal of Forecasting, 1 (1982): 293‑301; Tuomo Kuosa, The Evolution 
of Strategic Foresight: Navigating Public Policy Making (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012). On la 
prospective as a form of social engineering, see Jenny Andersson, “RAND Goes to France: 
comprendre les origines de la prospective française”, in preparation.
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highly significant in state and urban planning in the US, yet we still lack knowledge 
of the uses of these methods in the Soviet Union.56
In all, game simulation was a technique that bridged informal and formal organ-
ising. I suggest that the power of Shchedrovitskii’s management training was not so 
much in the specific content of his theory of reflexive thinking‑activity, but rather 
in its use, enabling Soviet managers to legitimately engage in informal negotia-
tions about the future. If scientific forecasting, cybernetic systems and other predic-
tive approaches aimed first and foremost at generating a formalised study of future 
developments and feeding this information to managers, Shchedrovitskii took a 
completely different route, arguing that his methods did not aim to offer certainty 
about the future, because “no one can tell beforehand what system‑structural under-
standings are necessary” for resolving a managerial problem.57 By this Shchedro-
vitskii meant that useful knowledge about the future could not be produced outside 
management activity. Instead, relevant knowledge, solutions and certainty can only 
emerge as a side‑effect of group activity‑thinking. Therefore these workshops facil-
itated the establishment of informal ties and the development of personal networks 
with the aim of pursuing practical projects in the future at the same time making the 
participants alert to governance as an intellectual, future‑oriented activity. 
Let us look more closely at activity games, a curious component of Russian 
management thinking that achieved surprising popularity in the 1980s. The origins 
of activity games can be traced to the post‑NEP period, 1932, when Maria Birshtein 
(1902‑1992) applied the method of war gaming to the management of a factory 
with the aim of increasing production. First affiliated with the Bureau of Scientific 
Organisation of Labour (NOT), Birshtein was later based at the Leningrad Institute 
of Engineering and Economics, where she developed a simulation game for a textile 
factory, running for 48 hours. This game enabled managers, engineers and admin-
istrators to establish ways of communicating across administrative divides that they 
later transferred to the actual working environment. Although proven successful, 
this method was short‑lived: alongside all scientific approaches to management 
and economics, activity games were banned by Stalin in 1938. Birshtein survived 
Leningrad’s blockade and resumed working during the post‑Stalinist period. 
Her first complete work was published in 1989 and circulated in 30,000 copies.58 
It seems therefore that Shchedrovitskii creatively transferred Vygotsky’s 
ideas on reflexivity, enriching them with Lefevr’s notion of semiotic control, to 
56. These gaming techniques were sometimes mediated by computer technology but not 
always (and never in Shchedrovitskii’s games in the Soviet Union). Business‑games were also 
developed in many Soviet research institutes, which cooperated with both the West and Eastern 
bloc. See Audra Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in 
Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 455‑456.
57. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Printsipy i obshchaia schema metodologicheskoi organizatsii 
sistemno‑strukturnykh issledovanii i razrabotok (1981),” 112.
58. John H. Gagnon, “Mary M. Birshtein: The Mother of Soviet Simulation Gaming,” Simu-
lation Gaming 18,3 (1987): 3‑12; M. Belchikov and M.M. Birshtein, Delovye igry [Business 
games] (Riga: AVOTS, 1989).
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the technique of simulation games, which he re‑branded as activity‑thinking (in 
Russian, mysle‑deiatel’nost).59 For us it is important that in doing this Shchedro-
vitskii relied on the notion of teleological behaviour, discussed earlier, according 
to which human behaviour is a goal‑directed system where thinking is mobilized 
to both set the goals and regulate the behaviour through feedback.60 Following 
Vygotsky, and in contrast to structuralists, Shchedrovitskii contended that “the 
world is not structured through language […] it is, in contrast, structured through 
activity (deiatel’nost’)”.61 An interesting point here is that if cybernetically‑inspired 
organisation theory developed a notion of disembodied rationality, expressed in 
both computer technology and American game theory, Shchedrovitskii adopted a 
different approach, one closer to the cybernetic notion of autopoiesis, a circular 
process where “a living system’s organisation causes certain products to be 
produced, … [and] these products in turn produce the organisational characteristics 
of that living system”.62 For Shchedrovitskii, collective reason was precisely such a 
case of societal autopoiesis, fundamentally embodied, social and enfolding through 
collective action.63
If prediction was about control, so was reflexivity: it was governmental appli-
cations that interested Shchedrovitskii. According to him, the governing system 
had to know the governed system. This was achieved by developing an under-
standing of the processes in the governed system, their causal relations, and having 
meta‑knowledge of the processes of governance. This knowledge then was to be 
used to control, to overpower the governed system. Yet this overpowering was not 
to be imposed from outside, but rather internalised with the help of social mecha-
nisms. According to his biographers, Shchedrovitskii did not believe in the produc-
tion of policy‑useful knowledge in the isolated environment of a scholar’s office. 
The future was to be discovered jointly by the group of stakeholders, and the role 
of the scholar, or methodologist, was to guide this discovery with the help of tech-
niques specially developed for the training sessions. 
One of the earliest games concerning the supply of consumer goods to the Urals 
region was organised in August 1979. The design of this exercise took 25 days and 
involved co‑production of both the method of self‑organisation and goals that this 
self‑organisation would strive to achieve. During this game (which lasted “only” 
nine days) in the village of Novaia Utka in Sverdlovsk region, the ineffective supply 
59. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia igra kak novaia forma organi-
zatsii i metod razvitiia kollektivnoi mysledeiatel´nosti (1983),[Organisational activity game as 
a new form of organisation and a method of development of collective thinking‑activity]” in 
Shchedrovitskii, Izbrannye, 115‑142.
60. Gregory Bedny, Mark Seglin, David Meister, “Activity Theory: History, Research and 
Application,” Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science 1, 2 (2000): 168‑206.
61. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Lektsiia 2: 19 fevralia 1988,” Zapisi Rizhskogo, 65.
62. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 136.
63. For an influential critique of disembodied reason see Hayles; for the construction of polit-
ical individualism in game theory see Amadae.
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of consumer goods to the region was not solved as such, but was replaced with 
a different goal, to create a new “programme of complex research and projects” 
that would serve as a platform for solving this problem of the supply of consumer 
goods in the future.64 A participant in one of these first games wrote retrospectively 
just how innovative, for both local administrators and intellectuals, was the idea 
of goal‑setting and an open future that was co‑produced during the game. Habit-
uated to repetitive re‑affirmation of faithful implementation of the Party’s plan, 
Soviet managers struggled to shape their own understanding, goals and projects. 
The whole process was mystifying for them: “Most different gossip was spreading 
and we whispered that this was Voland with his entourage”. Georgii Shchedrovit-
skii, the witness wrote, “trained his team until exhaustion” meanwhile the locals 
did not interest him as such, except as a platform for developing his method. 
“We were”, the witness wrote, “graduates from Ural universities, who did not 
possess either new ideas or high academic degrees, we had not been abroad, did 
not speak foreign languages and did not have experience of exploration, research, 
and analysis. […] In all people enjoyed his [Shchedrovitskii’s] internal dialogue”.65 
Here this participant described the seminar as an enjoyable show, but it is also 
clear from this account just how new the idea that management was an intellec-
tual activity was for Soviet administrators. Shchedrovitskii himself regarded this 
game as particularly successful, writing that a whole range of goal‑management 
tools were developed at Novaia Utka, and on the basis of this game he prepared 29 
further games conducted in 1979‑1981. The areas of application included the plan-
ning of nuclear power plants, cities, geological research, and higher education.66 
Acitivity‑games, wrote Shchedrovitskii were “a new, complex and systemic 
organizational form for team thinking activity”, where the information was actually 
co‑produced inside the meeting, the outcome being a new, better understanding of 
the situation.67 This was clearly a very performative understanding of knowledge:
[…] methodology was not simply a theory of the means and methods we 
employ in our thinking and activity, but was also a form of organization and 
thus a “framework” for all of people’s vital activity, including thinking activity. 
This kind of methodology could not be transmitted, like knowledge or a set of 
instruments, from one person to another, but rather could only evolve, grow 
out of a context, as it were, through people’s being brought into a sphere of 
methodological thinking activity that was new for them, but in which they were 
given the opportunity to participate in a complete and integral vital activity.68 
64. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia igra kak novaia forma organi-
zatsii i metod razvitiia kollektivnoi mysledeiatelnosti (1983),” 121, 124‑5.
65. Osintseva, “Novaia Utka.”
66. Shchedrovitskii, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia,” 127‑128.
67. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, S.I. Kotel´nikov, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia igra kak
novaia forma organizatsii i metod razvitiia kollektivnoi mysledeiatel´nosti”, in Izbrannye, 
113‑142.
68. Shchedrovitskii, Kotel´nikov, “Organizatsionnaia,” 118.
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It is quite striking that a previously marginalised scholar could now be involved 
in such a sensitive area of Soviet industry as nuclear energy. For example, Shche-
drovitskii was approached by the Institute for Staff Training of the All‑Union 
Ministry of Energy in Moscow to design an activity game for top managers at one 
of the most important Soviet nuclear plants, Beloiarsk, running from December 
1980 to July 1981.69 Beloiarsk was the first Soviet nuclear plant using a particu-
larly innovative fast breeder reactor BN‑600, which in theory could recycle 
spent nuclear fuel, but which also produced plutonium close to weapons‑grade.70 
The construction of this unique power plant was going slowly. Thus in March 
and April Shchedrovitskii went to Zarechnyi to conduct an activity game on 
“Providing for the normal functioning and development of technologies and 
development of the Nuclear Power Plant”. A striking feature of these activity 
games is that they were not so much about anticipating the unexpected, like the 
exercises of la prospective. Instead, Soviet activity games aimed to facilitate 
the recreation of conditions of “the expected” or “normal”.71 The goal was to 
remove all the unexpected issues, a pervasive part of Soviet managerial reality, 
and co‑produce certainty and mutual predictability among the management and 
engineers of the nuclear plant, hoping that this certainty would be transplanted 
into the actual running of the plant. 
It is important here to pause and note that Shchedrovitskii understood predicta-
bility in a particular way. Shchedrovitskii was careful to distance himself as far as 
possible from forecasters: he hardly mentioned at all the central promoter of Soviet 
scientific forecasting, Igor’ Bestuzhev‑Lada, in his memoirs. This is because Shche-
drovitskii understood prediction as a mere foretelling of the future; an end product 
that was decoupled from the context in which it was produced. Instead of predic-
tion, Shchedrovitskii preferred traditional categories of management‑speak, such as 
planning, programming and projecting.72 This choice of vocabulary, I suggest, was 
in fact a smart way to frame his method as a non‑revolutionary, conservative tool 
that resembled Party planning discourses. Indeed, if Soviet scientific forecasters 
pushed for institutional reform, the Moscow methodologists never tried to change 
the existing institutional governmental framework. Instead they tapped directly into 
the source of real power: informal relations and networks, gearing their method-
ology to enable processes “here and now”: situational analysis, goal‑setting and 
situational problematisation.73 
69. Petr Shchedrovitskii, “Predislovie [Foreword],” in Georgii Shchedrovitskii, Orguprav-
lencheskoe myshlenie: ideologiia, metodologiia, tekhnologiia (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Studii Arte-
miia Lebedeva, 2014 http://www.artlebedev.ru/everything/izdal/orgupravlencheskoe‑myshlenie/). 
70. I thank Tatiana Kasperski for the information on Beloiarsk nuclear power plant.
71. Shchedrovitskii, “Predislovie.”
72. See the story narrated by Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Perspektivy i programmy razvitiia
SMD‑metodologii [Perspectives and programmes of the development of methodology of 
systemic thinking‑activity],” www.bdn‑steiner.ru. Accessed on 10 April 2015.
73. Shchedrovitskii, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia igra kak novaia forma organizatsii,” 138.
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How, then, can a method that emphasises “here and now” produce a future? The 
answer is that the games enable the participants to “project and programme their 
future thinking‑activity” and re‑create this activity in any organisational context.74 
According to Shchedrovitskii, “the central law and principle” of an activity‑game is 
“organised chaos”, an independently active (samodeiatel’naia), self‑organising and 
self‑developing system.75 And, as I mentioned earlier, Shchedrovitskii’s “think-
ing‑activity” underscored the collective and performative character of thinking, it is 
never a disconnected, solitary exercise. In contrast, for him thinking‑activity could 
only be pursued as part of a team where a joint world (mir), amenable to control, 
would be constructed. Postulating that this world would include both governors and 
the governed and integrate their intersubjective understanding, Shchedrovitskii’s 
approach resembled Erwin Goffman, who defined games as world‑building activi-
ties and thus thinking‑activity is a way to perpetuate an informal collective into the 
future.76 In this way, Shchedrovitskii’s methodology mobilised a particular notion 
of governance, based on embodied, social and reflexive reason: an approach which 
was totally the opposite of RAND’s game theory, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma.
The activity‑game approach was not only post‑positivist, but also performative. 
Shchedrovitskii himself called his approach “constructionist‑projecting” therefore 
abolishing the positivist division between object and subject, which held that the 
social, natural and technical spheres were separate. In contrast, Shchedrovitskii 
argued that when a manager deals with objects or technical systems, he or she inev-
itably confronts cognitive schemes, intentions and behaviour patterns of humans 
associated with these objects. His colleague, Boris Iudin, describes Shchedrovit-
skii’s approach as an attempt to shift the focus of scholarship from the definition 
and control of individual objects to a complex of intellectual technologies which 
form the basis for the definition of and action upon the objects in question. Here 
a successful reflection was not the one generating new images, stories or precise 
data about the future, but a reflexive activity able to give continuous birth to new 
projects and action. As Shchedrovitskii remained a committed follower of Marxism, 
he borrowed from Marx the idea that scientific knowledge should be action‑ori-
ented and equipped it with the new vocabulary of systems theory, the cybernetic 
idea of feedback‑based control and psychological techniques.77 In this way, the 
activity‑game approach constituted a version of a highly sophisticated behaviorist 
governmentality, one that does not seek to engage with definitions of the subject, 
but rather is concerned with actions. 
And yet it should not be forgotten that Shchedrovitskii sought to transform the 
rigid practice of Soviet planning by going beyond the mechanical implementation 
74. Ibid., 140.
75. Ibid., fondgp.ru.
76. Erwin Goffman, Encounters (New York, 1961), cf Jennifer Light, “Taking”, 372.
77. Boris Iudin, “Ot gumanitarnogo znaniia k gumanitarnym tekhnologiiam [From humanities
knowledge to humanities technologies],” Gumanitarnye nauki: teoriia i metodologiia, 4 (2005): 
104‑107.
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of the official plan targets. He argued that activity‑thinking was a sociotechnics 
(sotsiotekhnika) that aimed to destabilise bureaucratic patterns of organisation, 
behaviour and thinking.78 A note is due here that Shchedrovitskii derived the term 
sociotechnics from the English term “systems engineering”, applying the systems 
engineering approach to any organisational situation.79 The idea was that socio-
technics dealt with hybrid objects or, as Shchedrovitskii called them, “centaurus 
objects”, where human activities and objects were intertwined at the same episte-
mological level.80 
The purpose of the games was to develop problems and not to find solutions 
to specific tasks; however, this was not revealed to game participants, who strove 
to resolve issues.81 For example, Shchedrovitskii described an activity‑game dedi-
cated to the development of societal systems, which involved 160‑190 participants 
in Krasnoiarsk in 1986 as follows:
So we, the gaming team, sought to “break out” from the present space of 
the activity into the space of history. I had really amused myself with my 
fellow‑gamers there, took a chance to enjoy myself. Why so? The [theme 
of the] game was so [great] that everyone was saying, I, I, I will come! And 
they came. […] I was saying, guys, excellent, since you are here, so get out! 
And they looked at me and said, we cannot see anything, it is dark and scary. 
I waited for a while and then suddenly pulled the carpet from underneath their 
feet, and they all went flying in the space of history, and it was very interesting 
to see how they jerked their little arms and legs”.82
To be sure, this quote is drawn from Shchedrovitskii’s retrospective narrative and 
tells us more about his own approach to his seminars rather than what actually 
happened there. It is clear, however, that for Shchedrovitskii the goal of his meth-
odology was disrupting existing templates of speaking about the past and future. 
This quote also reveals that he did not hide his own pleasure at watching people 
losing the safety of conventional meaning‑making. An account of another activi-
ty‑game, conducted with the municipality of Riga in Soviet Latvia (1986), noted 
that the chairman of the Riga city council realised that it was futile to try to solve 
managerial problems without a longer term, strategic understanding of the future of 
78. Shchedrovitskii, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia igra kak novaia forma organizatsii,”
141.
79. Shchedrovitskii refers to the Russian translation (1962) of the work of US scholars, Harry
Good, Robert Machol, Systems Engineering: An Introduction to the Design of Large‑Scale 
Systems (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1957).
80. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Budushchee est´ rabota myshleniia i deistviia [The future is a
work of thinking and activity],” Voprosy metodologii, 3‑4 (1994). Available at fondgp.ru, 
accessed on 15 April 2015.
81. Shchedrovitskii, “Organizatsionno‑deiatel´nostnaia igra kak novaia forma organizatsii
myslediatel´nosti”.
82.  Shchedrovitskii, “Lektsiia 2,” 71.
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the city.83 Using the long term to frame current problems in the context of either the 
past or the future, Shchedrovitskii aimed to estrange Soviet managers from their 
minute, day‑to‑day problem solving and by virtue of reflecting back on themselves 
– in their organisational roles that formed part of a larger governmental project – to
project themselves into the far future.84 
Post‑Soviet Legacy
The case of Shchedrovitskii is central for understanding the post‑Soviet transfor-
mation. Emphasising reflexivity, taking into account interaction between human 
and material systems as they were enmeshed together and projected into the future, 
Shchedrovitskii’s methodology foregrounds a shift in Soviet management, where 
a centrally commanded system was replaced by a market economy and Marxist‑ 
Leninist ideology was replaced by complex semiotic technologies of manipulating 
public opinion and consumer behaviour. This is not to say that Shchedrovitskii 
exerted direct influence on post‑Soviet leaders, but rather to suggest that Shche-
drovitskii’s methodology played a highly important role in enabling much of the 
top Soviet management to cope with the transition from a centrally‑commanded, 
politicised system to the market economy and complex world of new media tech-
nologies. Although Georgii Shchedrovitskii did not live to see the boom of the 
media and internet technologies of the 1990s, his theoretical vocabulary bridged 
the model of ideological indoctrination and complex, systems theory‑based models 
of reflexive control of collective behaviour. 
Shchedrovitskii’s work has been continued by his followers to the present, to 
a large extent by his son Petr, who pioneered much of the strategy training in the 
public sector of the Russian Federation, established a School of Cultural Policy 
and, in 2005, the Scientific Foundation of Georgii Shchedrovitskii in Moscow. Petr 
Shchedrovitskii himself became a highly influential management consultant and 
political technologist in Russia: he claims to have trained about 100,000 managers, 
ranging from cultural managers to diamond producers. Also, from the year 2000 he 
co‑authored and widely disseminated the idea of the “Russian world” (Ruskii mir), 
or global and transnational communities of Russian speakers, who can be strategi-
cally mobilised to pursue Russia’s national goals.85 Furthermore, in recent years, 
83. Shchedrovitskii, “Lektsiia 2.”
84. Such an emancipation was questioned by the representatives of the ideological control at 
these workshops; for instance, in the case of a different game on free elections, a high offi-
cial in the Riga city government warned the participants to “behave themselves,” something 
which a game technologist Sergei Popov refused to do. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, Organizatsiia, 
rukovodstvo, upravlenie II [Organisation, leadership, governance] (M.: Put´, 2003), 36‑37. 
85. For more on the Russian world, see Michael Gorham, “Virtual Rusophonia: Language 
Policy as ‘Soft Power’ in the New Media Age,” Digital Icons, 5 (2011): 23‑48; Andis Kudors, 
“‘Russian World’: Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy,” Russian Analytical 
Digest, 81 (16 June 2010): 2‑4.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.92 - 05/02/2018 17h19. © Éditions de l'EHESS 
132 EGLĖ RINDZEVIČIŪTĖ
the intellectual legacy of Georgii Shchedrovitskii has been institutionalised through 
the many volumes republishing his articles, lectures and activity‑game training 
sessions. Histories of Russian managerial thought inevitably include Shchedrovit-
skii as an important phenomenon and attempts are made to introduce him in English 
and French, where highly positioned officials in Putin’s regime pay homage to 
Shchedrovitskii’s methodology.86 
Shchedrovitskii’s work is therefore deeply ambivalent. In the 1970s‑1980s 
Shchedrovitskii’s notion of thinking‑activity constituted an important break in 
the governmental logic of progressive time and, in turn, the communist future 
as laid out in the Party’s plans. In contrast to an input‑output model of predic-
tive expertise, where specialists feed data to policy makers to help them to make 
informed decisions, Shchedrovitskii’s method is not linear: there is no clear 
division between language, thinking and behaviour, subject and object. Instead, 
Shchedrovitskii’s method underscores the reflexive and performative character of 
thinking in a group: he argues that ideas cannot be separated from subjects and 
thinking is a form of activity. A study of this phenomenon thus cannot claim to 
merely deconstruct this mentality of governance by revealing its hidden social 
or political rationales; this is simply because thinking‑activity is an open (docu-
mented in publications) but opaque, indeed, anarchic method that both acknowl-
edges and boasts its manipulative power, while rejecting the idea of any singularly 
defined “truths”, be they efficiency, rationality or order. There is also an issue of 
source materials: only some moments of the thinking‑activity games, usually the 
follow‑up discussions, were recorded. 
Conclusion: Reflexive Authoritarian Future?
This article argues for the importance of thinking‑activity and organisational‑ac-
tivity games as a form of scientific governmentality of the future in the Soviet 
Union. Unlike scientific forecasting, which produced detailed images of the future 
in graphs and maps of statistical trends, thinking‑activity was a performative intel-
lectual technology, which sought to destabilise the Soviet present by overthrowing 
the administrative and conceptual frameworks that guided the managers who 
participated in Shchedrovitskii’s games. The idea was to undermine the rigidly 
defined administrative bureaucratic roles, which were strongly linked with specific, 
short‑term problems and enmeshed in “avral”, or last‑minute management. 
The breaking down of this framework, according to Shchedrovitskii, gave an oppor-
tunity to the managers to think about the long term and develop a more holistic, 
systemic view of their governmental task. Yet what did the long term future hold 
in Shchedrovitskii’s seminars? 
86. Violetta Volkova, Iz istorii teorii sistem i sistemnogo analiza [From the history of the
theory of systems and systems analysis] (SPb.: SPbGPU, 2004); also Tabatchnikova, Le cercle; 
V.B.  Kristenko, A.G.  Reus, A.P.  Zinchenko, eds. Methodological School of Management 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
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It is difficult to give a conclusive answer, yet the methodology of Shchedro-
vitskii’s seminars, aimed at fostering trust and informal relations, probably led 
to the building of new, horizontal ties, thus undermining the existing, centralised 
and bureaucratic hierarchies. The informality promoted by Shchedrovitskii was 
substantially different from the economy of favours or “blat”. Shchedrovitskii’s 
seminars, esoteric and conducted in remote places, clearly had an aura of access 
to exclusive, esoteric knowledge, or rather skills, as they broke away from the 
usual bureaucratic milieus with the aim of encouraging autonomous goal‑setting. 
Here, management was dissociated from the mere implementation of Party plans 
and transformed into a collective, reflexive goal‑setting activity. Shchedrovit-
skii also juxtaposed his method to scientific forecasting, saying that forecasting 
only provides knowledge about the “self‑developing”, “natural world”, whereas 
reflexive thinking‑activity, expressed in programming and projecting, was part of 
human teleological behaviour.87 
Hence Shchedrovitskii was not fully consistent: although he defined organising 
as sociotechnics, blurring the boundaries between humans and natural objects, 
when it came to the institutional positioning of his methodology, he claimed that 
the method of scientific forecasting could only be applied to predict the “natural 
world”, whereas thinking‑activity applied to human behaviour. This conceptual 
inconsistency was probably rooted in his desire to stand apart from the Soviet 
forecasting community, as they were closely integrated in the administrative plan-
ning system. With his “methodology” Shchedrovitskii sought to empower Soviet 
managers and directors, enabling them better to control their workers, but these 
were soft, semiotic methods of control that had nothing to do with ideological 
indoctrination or repression. In the Soviet context, Shchedrovitskii thus introduced 
a new notion of the future as an enfolding reality that is brought into being through 
what he called “forward reflexiveness”.88
However, unlike scientific forecasting, Shchedrovitskii’s technique did not 
challenge the existing hierarchies and rules of Soviet bureaucracy. If scientific 
forecasters at the Gosplan Research Institute of Economics called for transparency 
and more open circulation of data,89 the sessions of organisational‑activity games 
would foster the formation of informal, non‑transparent networks never aimed 
at reforming the system itself. Unlike economic forecasters, dismissed as elitist 
technocrats, Shchedrovitskii’s managers remained invisible socio‑political tech-
nologists. Although some scholars interpreted Shchedrovitskii’s seminars as exam-
ples of Soviet civil society, their effects were rather ambivalent. For sure, these 
seminars brought together new socio‑political elites and encouraged their informal 
self‑organisation. It is quite possible that informal ties, symbolically reinforced by 
87. Georgii Shchedrovitskii, “Budushchee est´ rabota myshleniia i deistviia.”
88. Shchedrovitsky, Moscow Methodological, 38.
89. For more on scientific forecasting and glasnost’ see Rindzevičiūtė, “A Struggle for
Soviet Future.”
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Shchedrovitskii’s scientific authority, were more important than the future visions 
themselves, forged in the discrete, laboratory‑like locations of activity‑games. 
But an answer can also be found in the conserving effect of the activity games 
that sought to discover the conditions for the “normal” rather than to experiment 
with the conditions for radically new things. Even in the late 1980s Georgii Shche-
drovitskii emphasised that his method is different from the alarmist and critical 
warnings of other scientists, who sought, in the words of Aaron Wildawsky, to 
“speak truth to power”. Instead, thinking‑activity is geared to providing “concrete 
solutions”, the key emphasis being on coordination and self‑regulation beyond 
formal bureaucratic structures. Thus in Shchedrovitskii’s circles the power to 
shape the future became linked to the notion of an informal community, integrated 
through informational processes. After 1991, the reflexive methodology of Shche-
drovitskii lost its alter ego, the centralised command economy, to become a tool in 
the hands of the new Russian political technologists, but the later political career of 
this reflexive technology of the future is a subject for a different study. 
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